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Reproducibility is a defining feature of science, but the extent to which it characterizes
current research is unknown.We conducted replications of 100 experimental and correlational
studies published in three psychology journals using high-powered designs and original
materials when available. Replication effects were half the magnitude of original effects,
representing a substantial decline. Ninety-seven percent of original studies had statistically
significant results.Thirty-six percent of replications had statistically significant results; 47%
of original effect sizes were in the 95% confidence interval of the replication effect size; 39%of
effects were subjectively rated to have replicated the original result; and if no bias in original
results is assumed, combining original and replication results left 68% with statistically
significant effects. Correlational tests suggest that replication success was better predicted by
the strength of original evidence than by characteristics of the original and replication teams.
R
eproducibility is a core principle of scien-
tific progress (1–6). Scientific claims should
not gain credence because of the status or
authority of their originator but by the
replicability of their supporting evidence.
Scientists attempt to transparently describe the
methodology and resulting evidence used to sup-
port their claims. Other scientists agree or dis-
agree whether the evidence supports the claims,
citing theoretical or methodological reasons or
by collecting new evidence. Such debates are
meaningless, however, if the evidence being
debated is not reproducible.
Even research of exemplary quality may have
irreproducible empirical findings because of ran-
dom or systematic error. Direct replication is
the attempt to recreate the conditions believed
sufficient for obtaining a previously observed
finding (7, 8) and is the means of establishing
reproducibility of a finding with new data. A
direct replication may not obtain the original
result for a variety of reasons: Known or un-
known differences between the replication and
original study may moderate the size of an ob-
served effect, the original result could have been
a false positive, or the replication could produce
a false negative. False positives and false nega-
tives providemisleading informationabout effects,
and failure to identify the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions to reproduce a finding indicates
an incomplete theoretical understanding. Direct
replication provides the opportunity to assess
and improve reproducibility.
There is plenty of concern (9–13) about the
rate and predictors of reproducibility but limited
evidence. In a theoretical analysis, Ioannidis es-
timated that publishing and analytic practices
make it likely that more than half of research
results are false and therefore irreproducible (9).
Some empirical evidence supports this analysis.
In cell biology, two industrial laboratories re-
ported success replicating the original results of
landmark findings in only 11 and 25% of the
attempted cases, respectively (10, 11). These num-
bers are stunning but also difficult to interpret
because no details are available about the studies,
methodology, or results.With no transparency, the
reasons for low reproducibility cannot be evaluated.
Other investigations point to practices and
incentives that may inflate the likelihood of
obtaining false-positive results in particular or
irreproducible results more generally. Poten-
tially problematic practices include selective
reporting, selective analysis, and insufficient
specification of the conditions necessary or suf-
ficient to obtain the results (12–23). We were in-
spired to address the gap in direct empirical
evidence about reproducibility. In this Research
Article, we report a large-scale, collaborative ef-
fort to obtain an initial estimate of the reproduc-
ibility of psychological science.
Method
Starting in November 2011, we constructed a
protocol for selecting and conducting high-
quality replications (24). Collaborators joined
the project, selected a study for replication from
the available studies in the sampling frame, and
were guided through the replication protocol.
The replication protocol articulated the process
of selecting the study and key effect from the
available articles, contacting the original authors
for study materials, preparing a study protocol
and analysis plan, obtaining review of the pro-
tocol by the original authors and other members
within the present project, registering the pro-
tocol publicly, conducting the replication, writ-
ing the final report, and auditing the process and
analysis for quality control. Project coordinators
facilitated each step of the process and main-
tained the protocol and project resources. Repli-
cation materials and data were required to be
archived publicly in order to maximize transpar-
ency, accountability, and reproducibility of the
project (https://osf.io/ezcuj).
In total, 100 replications were completed by
270 contributing authors. There were many dif-
ferent research designs and analysis strategies
in the original research. Through consultation
with original authors, obtaining original mate-
rials, and internal review, replicationsmaintained
high fidelity to the original designs. Analyses con-
verted results to a common effect sizemetric [cor-
relation coefficient (r)] with confidence intervals
(CIs). The units of analysis for inferences about
reproducibility were the original and replication
study effect sizes. The resulting open data set
provides an initial estimate of the reproducibility
of psychology and correlational data to support
development of hypotheses about the causes of
reproducibility.
Sampling frame and study selection
We constructed a sampling frame and selection
process to minimize selection biases and maxi-
mize generalizability of the accumulated evi-
dence. Simultaneously, to maintain high quality,
within this sampling frame we matched indi-
vidual replication projects with teams that had
relevant interests and expertise. We pursued a
quasi-random sample by defining the sampling
frame as 2008 articles of three important psy-
chology journals: Psychological Science (PSCI),
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
(JPSP), and Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (JEP:
LMC). The first is a premier outlet for all psy-
chological research; the second and third are
leading disciplinary-specific journals for social
psychology and cognitive psychology, respec-
tively [more information is available in (24)].
These were selected a priori in order to (i) pro-
vide a tractable sampling frame that would not
plausibly bias reproducibility estimates, (ii) en-
able comparisons across journal types and sub-
disciplines, (iii) fit with the range of expertise
available in the initial collaborative team, (iv) be
recent enough to obtain originalmaterials, (v) be
old enough to obtain meaningful indicators of ci-
tation impact, and (vi) represent psychology sub-
disciplines that have a high frequency of studies
that are feasible to conduct at relatively low cost.
The first replication teams could select from a
pool of the first 20 articles from each journal,
starting with the first article published in the
first 2008 issue. Project coordinators facilitated
matching articles with replication teams by in-
terests and expertise until the remaining arti-
cles were difficult to match. If there were still
interested teams, then another 10 articles from
one or more of the three journals were made
available from the sampling frame. Further,
project coordinators actively recruited teams
from the community with relevant experience
for particular articles. This approach balanced
competing goals: minimizing selection bias by
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having only a small set of articles available at a
time and matching studies with replication
teams’ interests, resources, and expertise.
By default, the last experiment reported in
each article was the subject of replication. This
decision established an objective standard for
study selection within an article and was based
on the intuition that the first study in amultiple-
study article (the obvious alternative selection
strategy) was more frequently a preliminary
demonstration. Deviations from selecting the
last experiment were made occasionally on
the basis of feasibility or recommendations of
the original authors. Justifications for deviations
were reported in the replication reports, which
weremade available on the Open Science Frame-
work (OSF) (http://osf.io/ezcuj). In total, 84 of
the 100 completed replications (84%) were of
the last reported study in the article. On aver-
age, the to-be-replicated articles contained 2.99
studies (SD = 1.78) with the following distribu-
tion: 24 single study, 24 two studies, 18 three
studies, 13 four studies, 12 five studies, 9 six or
more studies. All following summary statistics
refer to the 100 completed replications.
For the purposes of aggregating results across
studies to estimate reproducibility, a key result
from the selected experiment was identified as
the focus of replication. The key result had to be
represented as a single statistical inference test
or an effect size. In most cases, that test was a
t test, F test, or correlation coefficient. This effect
was identified before data collection or analysis
andwas presented to the original authors as part
of the design protocol for critique. Original au-
thors occasionally suggested that a different
effect be used, and by default, replication teams
deferred to original authors’ judgments. None-
theless, because the single effect came from a
single study, it is not necessarily the case that
the identified effect was central to the overall
aims of the article. In the individual replication
reports and subjective assessments of replica-
tion outcomes, more than a single result could
be examined, but only the result of the single
effect was considered in the aggregate analyses
[additional details of the general protocol and
individual study methods are provided in the
supplementary materials and (25)].
In total, there were 488 articles in the 2008
issues of the three journals. One hundred fifty-
eight of these (32%) became eligible for selec-
tion for replication during the project period,
between November 2011 and December 2014.
From those, 111 articles (70%) were selected by a
replication team, producing 113 replications. Two
articles had two replications each (supplementary
materials). And 100 of those (88%) replications
were completed by the project deadline for in-
clusion in this aggregate report. After being
claimed, some studies were not completed be-
cause the replication teams ran out of time or
could not devote sufficient resources to com-
pleting the study. By journal, replications were
completed for 39 of 64 (61%) articles from
PSCI, 31 of 55 (56%) articles from JPSP, and 28
of 39 (72%) articles from JEP:LMC.
Themost common reasons for failure tomatch
an article with a teamwere feasibility constraints
for conducting the research. Of the 47 articles
from the eligible pool that were not claimed, six
(13%) had been deemed infeasible to replicate
because of time, resources, instrumentation, de-
pendence on historical events, or hard-to-access
samples. The remaining 41 (87%) were eligible
but not claimed. These often required specialized
samples (such asmacaques or peoplewith autism),
resources (such as eye tracking machines or func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging), or knowl-
edge making them difficult to match with teams.
Aggregate data preparation
Each replication team conducted the study, an-
alyzed their data, wrote their summary report,
and completed a checklist of requirements for
sharing the materials and data. Then, indepen-
dent reviewers and analysts conducted a project-
wide audit of all individual projects, materials,
data, and reports. A description of this review is
available on the OSF (https://osf.io/xtine). More-
over, to maximize reproducibility and accuracy,
the analyses for every replication study were re-
produced by another analyst independent of
the replication team using the R statistical pro-
gramming language and a standardized analytic
format. A controller R script was created to re-
generate the entire analysis of every study and
recreate the master data file. This R script, avail-
able at https://osf.io/fkmwg, can be executed to
reproduce the results of the individual studies. A
comprehensive description of this reanalysis pro-
cess is available publicly (https://osf.io/a2eyg).
Measures and moderators
We assessed features of the original study and
replication as possible correlates of reproduc-
ibility and conducted exploratory analyses to
inspire further investigation. These included
characteristics of the original study such as the
publishing journal; original effect size, P value,
and sample size; experience and expertise of the
original research team; importance of the effect,
with indicators such as the citation impact of
the article; and rated surprisingness of the ef-
fect. We also assessed characteristics of the rep-
lication such as statistical power and sample size,
experience and expertise of the replication team,
independently assessed challenge of conducting
an effective replication, and self-assessed quality
of the replication effort. Variables such as the P
value indicate the statistical strength of evidence
given the null hypothesis, and variables such as
“effect surprisingness” and “expertise of the team”
indicate qualities of the topic of study and the
teams studying it, respectively. Themaster data file,
containing these and other variables, is available
for exploratory analysis (https://osf.io/5wup8).
It is possible to derive a variety of hypotheses
about predictors of reproducibility. To reduce the
likelihood of false positives due to many tests, we
aggregated some variables into summary indica-
tors: experience and expertise of original team,
experience and expertise of replication team, chal-
lenge of replication, self-assessed quality of repli-
cation, and importance of the effect. We had no a
priori justification to give some indicators stron-
ger weighting over others, so aggregates were
created by standardizing [mean (M) = 0, SD = 1]
the individual variables and then averaging to
create a single index. In addition to the publish-
ing journal and subdiscipline, potential moder-
ators included six characteristics of the original
study and five characteristics of the replication
(supplementary materials).
Publishing journal and subdiscipline
Journals’ different publishing practices may re-
sult in a selection bias that covaries with repro-
ducibility. Articles from three journals were made
available for selection: JPSP (n = 59 articles), JEP:
LMC (n = 40 articles), and PSCI (n = 68 articles).
From this pool of available studies, replications
were selected and completed from JPSP (n = 32
studies), JEP:LMC (n = 28 studies), and PSCI
(n = 40 studies) and were coded as representing
cognitive (n = 43 studies) or social-personality
(n = 57 studies) subdisciplines. Four studies that
would ordinarily beunderstoodas “developmental
psychology”becauseof studying childrenor infants
were coded as having a cognitive or social em-
phasis. Reproducibility may vary by subdiscipline
in psychology because of differing practices. For
example, within-subjects designs are more com-
mon in cognitive than social psychology, and
these designs often have greater power to detect
effects with the same number of participants.
Statistical analyses
There is no single standard for evaluating rep-
lication success (25). We evaluated reproducibil-
ity using significance and P values, effect sizes,
subjective assessments of replication teams, and
meta-analyses of effect sizes. All five of these
indicators contribute information about the re-
lations between the replication and original find-
ing and the cumulative evidence about the effect
and were positively correlated with one another
(r ranged from 0.22 to 0.96, median r = 0.57).
Results are summarized in Table 1, and full details
of analyses are in the supplementary materials.
Significance and P values
Assuming a two-tailed test and significance or
a level of 0.05, all test results of original and
replication studies were classified as statisti-
cally significant (P ≤ 0.05) and nonsignificant
(P > 0.05). However, original studies that inter-
preted nonsignificant P values as significant
were coded as significant (four cases, all with
P values < 0.06). Using only the nonsignificant
P values of the replication studies and applying
Fisher’s method (26), we tested the hypothesis
that these studies had “no evidential value” (the
null hypothesis of zero-effect holds for all these
studies). We tested the hypothesis that the pro-
portions of statistically significant results in the
original and replication studies are equal using
theMcNemar test for paired nominal data and
calculated a CI of the reproducibility parame-
ter. Second, we compared the central tendency
of the distribution of P values of original and
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replication studies using the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test and the t test for dependent samples.
For both tests, we only used study-pairs for which
both P values were available.
Effect sizes
We transformed effect sizes into correlation co-
efficients whenever possible. Correlation coeffi-
cients have several advantages over other effect
size measures, such as Cohen’s d. Correlation
coefficients are bounded, well known, and there-
fore more readily interpretable. Most impor-
tant for our purposes, analysis of correlation
coefficients is straightforward because, after ap-
plying the Fisher transformation, their standard
error is only a function of sample size. Formulas
and code for converting test statistics z, F, t, and
c2 into correlation coefficients are provided in
the appendices at http://osf.io/ezum7. To be able
to compare and analyze correlations across study-
pairs, the original study’s effect size was coded
as positive; the replication study’s effect size was
coded as negative if the replication study’s effect
was opposite to that of the original study.
We compared effect sizes using four tests. We
compared the central tendency of the effect size
distributions of original and replication studies
using both a paired two-sample t test and the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Third, we computed
the proportion of study-pairs in which the effect
of the original study was stronger than in the
replication study and tested the hypothesis that
this proportion is 0.5. For this test, we included
findings for which effect size measures were
available but no correlation coefficient could be
computed (for example, if a regression coefficient
was reported but not its test statistic). Fourth,
we calculated “coverage,” or the proportion of
study-pairs in which the effect of the original
study was in the CI of the effect of the replication
study, and compared this with the expected pro-
portion using a goodness-of-fit c2 test. We carried
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Table 2. Spearman’s rank-order correlations of reproducibility indicators with summary original and replication study characteristics. Effect size difference
computed after converting r to Fisher’s z. df/N refers to the information on which the test of the effect was based (for example, df of t test, denominator df of F test,
sample size –3 of correlation, and sample size for z and c2). Four original results had P values slightly higher than 0.05 but were considered positive results in the
original article andare treated thatwayhere. Exclusions (explanation provided in supplementarymaterials, A3) are “replicationsP< .05” (3 original nulls excluded; n=
97 studies), “effect size difference” (3 excluded; n=97 studies); “meta-analyticmean estimates” (27 excluded; n=73 studies); and, “percent original effect sizewithin
replication 95% CI” (5 excluded, n = 95 studies).
Replications
P < 0.05 in
original direction
Effect size
difference
Meta-analytic
estimate
Original effect
size within
replication 95% CI
Subjective “yes”
to “Did it replicate?”
Original study characteristics
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Original P value –0.327 –0.057 –0.468 0.032 –0.260
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Original effect size 0.304 0.279 0.793 0.121 0.277
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Original df/N –0.150 –0.194 –0.502 –0.221 –0.185
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Importance of original result –0.105 0.038 –0.205 –0.133 –0.074
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Surprising original result –0.244 0.102 –0.181 –0.113 –0.241
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Experience and expertise of original team –0.072 –0.033 –0.059 –0.103 –0.044
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Replication characteristics
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Replication P value –0.828 0.621 –0.614 –0.562 –0.738
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Replication effect size 0.731 –0.586 0.850 0.611 0.710
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Replication power 0.368 –0.053 0.142 –0.056 0.285
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Replication df/N –0.085 –0.224 –0.692 –0.257 –0.164
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Challenge of conducting replication –0.219 0.085 –0.301 –0.109 –0.151
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Experience and expertise of replication team –0.096 0.133 0.017 –0.053 –0.068
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Self-assessed quality of replication –0.069 0.017 0.054 –0.088 –0.055
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Table 1. Summary of reproducibility rates and effect sizes for original and replication studies overall and by journal/discipline. df/N refers to the information
on which the test of the effect was based (for example, df of t test, denominator df of F test, sample size –3 of correlation, and sample size for z and c2). Four original
results had P values slightly higher than 0.05 butwere considered positive results in the original article and are treated that way here. Exclusions (explanation provided in
supplementary materials, A3) are “replications P < 0.05” (3 original nulls excluded; n = 97 studies); “mean original and replication effect sizes” (3 excluded; n = 97
studies); “meta-analyticmean estimates” (27 excluded;n=73 studies); “percentmeta-analytic (P<0.05)” (25excluded;n=75studies); and, “percent original effect size
within replication 95% CI” (5 excluded, n = 95 studies).
Effect size comparison Original and replication combined
Replications
P < 0.05
in original
direction
Percent
Mean
(SD)
original
effect
size
Median
original
df/N
Mean (SD)
replication
effect size
Median
replication
df/N
Average
replication
power
Meta-
analytic
mean (SD)
estimate
Percent
meta-
analytic
(P < 0.05)
Percent
original
effect size
within
replication
95% CI
Percent
subjective
“yes” to
“Did it
replicate?”
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
Overall 35/97 36 0.403 (0.188) 54 0.197 (0.257) 68 0.92 0.309 (0.223) 68 47 39
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
JPSP, social 7/31 23 0.29 (0.10) 73 0.07 (0.11) 120 0.91 0.138 (0.087) 43 34 25
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
JEP:LMC, cognitive 13/27 48 0.47 (0.18) 36.5 0.27 (0.24) 43 0.93 0.393 (0.209) 86 62 54
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
PSCI, social 7/24 29 0.39 (0.20) 76 0.21 (0.30) 122 0.92 0.286 (0.228) 58 40 32
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
PSCI, cognitive 8/15 53 0.53 (0.2) 23 0.29 (0.35) 21 0.94 0.464 (0.221) 92 60 53
.. .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .. ... .. ... ... .. ... ... .
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out this test on the subset of study pairs in which
both the correlation coefficient and its standard
error could be computed [we refer to this data
set as the meta-analytic (MA) subset]. Standard
errors could only be computed if test statistics
were r, t, or F(1,df2). The expected proportion is
the sum over expected probabilities across study-
pairs. The test assumes the same population effect
size for original and replication study in the same
study-pair. For those studies that tested the effect
withF(df1 > 1, df2) or c
2, we verified coverage using
other statistical procedures (computational details
are provided in the supplementary materials).
Meta-analysis combining original and
replication effects
We conducted fixed-effect meta-analyses using
the R packagemetafor (27) on Fisher-transformed
correlations for all study-pairs in subset MA and
on study-pairs with the odds ratio as the depen-
dent variable. The number of times the CI of all
these meta-analyses contained 0 was calculated.
For studies in the MA subset, estimated effect
sizes were averaged and analyzed by discipline.
Subjective assessment of “Did it replicate?”
In addition to the quantitative assessments of
replication and effect estimation, we collected
subjective assessments of whether the replica-
tion provided evidence of replicating the origi-
nal result. In some cases, the quantitative data
anticipate a straightforward subjective assess-
ment of replication. For more complex designs,
such as multivariate interaction effects, the quan-
titative analysis may not provide a simple inter-
pretation. For subjective assessment, replication
teams answered “yes” or “no” to the question,
“Did your results replicate the original effect?”
Additional subjective variables are available for
analysis in the full data set.
Analysis of moderators
We correlated the five indicators evaluating
reproducibility with six indicators of the origi-
nal study (original P value, original effect size,
original sample size, importance of the effect,
surprising effect, and experience and expertise
of original team) and seven indicators of the
replication study (replication P value, replica-
tion effect size, replication power based on orig-
inal effect size, replication sample size, challenge
of conducting replication, experience and exper-
tise of replication team, and self-assessed qual-
ity of replication) (Table 2). As follow-up, we did
the same with the individual indicators compris-
ing the moderator variables (tables S3 and S4).
Results
Evaluating replication effect against null
hypothesis of no effect
A straightforward method for evaluating repli-
cation is to test whether the replication shows a
statistically significant effect (P < 0.05) with the
same direction as the original study. This di-
chotomous vote-counting method is intuitively
appealing and consistent with common heu-
ristics used to decide whether original studies
“worked.” Ninety-seven of 100 (97%) effects
from original studies were positive results (four
had P values falling a bit short of the 0.05
criterion—P=0.0508, 0.0514, 0.0516, and0.0567—
but all of these were interpreted as positive
effects). On the basis of only the average rep-
lication power of the 97 original, significant ef-
fects [M = 0.92, median (Mdn) = 0.95], we would
expect approximately 89 positive results in the
replications if all original effects were true and
accurately estimated; however, there were just
35 [36.1%; 95%CI = (26.6%, 46.2%)], a significant
reduction [McNemar test, c2(1) = 59.1, P < 0.001].
A key weakness of this method is that it treats
the 0.05 threshold as a bright-line criterion be-
tween replication success and failure (28). It
could be that many of the replications fell just
short of the 0.05 criterion. The density plots of
P values for original studies (mean P value =
0.028) and replications (mean P value = 0.302)
are shown in Fig. 1, left. The 64 nonsignificant
P values for replications were distributed widely.
When there is no effect to detect, the null distribu-
tion of P values is uniform. This distribution de-
viated slightly from uniform with positive skew,
however, suggesting that at least one replication
could be a false negative, c2(128) = 155.83, P =
0.048. Nonetheless, the wide distribution of P
values suggests against insufficient power as the
only explanation for failures to replicate. A scat-
terplot of original compared with replication
study P values is shown in Fig. 2.
Evaluating replication effect against
original effect size
A complementary method for evaluating repli-
cation is to test whether the original effect size is
within the 95%CI of the effect size estimate from
the replication. For the subset of 73 studies in
which the standard error of the correlation could
be computed, 30 (41.1%) of the replication CIs
contained the original effect size (significantly
lower than the expected value of 78.5%, P <
0.001) (supplementary materials). For 22 studies
using other test statistics [F(df1 > 1, df2) and c
2],
68.2% of CIs contained the effect size of the
original study. Overall, this analysis suggests a
47.4% replication success rate.
This method addresses the weakness of the
first test that a replication in the same direction
and a P value of 0.06 may not be significantly
different from the original result. However, the
method will also indicate that a replication “fails”
when the direction of the effect is the same but
the replication effect size is significantly smaller
than the original effect size (29). Also, the repli-
cation “succeeds”when the result is near zero but
not estimated with sufficiently high precision to
be distinguished from the original effect size.
Comparing original and replication
effect sizes
Comparing the magnitude of the original and
replication effect sizes avoids special emphasis
on P values. Overall, original study effect sizes
aac4716-4 28 AUGUST 2015 • VOL 349 ISSUE 6251 sciencemag.org SCIENCE
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Original Studies Replications
p−
va
lu
e
Quantile
100
75
50
25
−0.25
−0.50
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Original Studies Replications
Ef
fe
ct
 S
ize
Quantile
100
75
50
25
Fig. 1. Density plots of original and replication P values and effect sizes. (A) P values. (B) Effect sizes (correlation coefficients). Lowest quantiles for
P values are not visible because they are clustered near zero.
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(M = 0.403, SD= 0.188) were reliably larger than
replication effect sizes (M = 0.197, SD = 0.257),
Wilcoxon’sW = 7137, P < 0.001. Of the 99 studies
for which an effect size in both the original and
replication study could be calculated (30), 82
showed a stronger effect size in the original
study (82.8%; P < 0.001, binomial test) (Fig. 1,
right). Original and replication effect sizes were
positively correlated (Spearman’s r = 0.51, P <
0.001). A scatterplot of the original and repli-
cation effect sizes is presented in Fig. 3.
Combining original and replication effect
sizes for cumulative evidence
The disadvantage of the descriptive comparison
of effect sizes is that it does not provide information
about the precision of either estimate or resolution
of the cumulative evidence for the effect. This is
often addressed by computing a meta-analytic es-
timate of the effect sizes by combining the original
and replication studies (28). This approachweights
each study by the inverse of its variance and uses
these weighted estimates of effect size to estimate
cumulative evidence and precision of the effect.
Using a fixed-effect model, 51 of the 75 (68%) ef-
fects for which a meta-analytic estimate could be
computed had 95% CIs that did not include 0.
One qualification about this result is the pos-
sibility that the original studies have inflated
effect sizes due to publication, selection, report-
ing, or other biases (9, 12–23). In a discipline with
low-powered research designs and an emphasis
on positive results for publication, effect sizes
will be systematically overestimated in the pub-
lished literature. There is no publication bias in
the replication studies because all results are
reported. Also, there are no selection or reporting
biases because all were confirmatory tests based
on pre-analysis plans. This maximizes the inter-
pretability of the replication P values and effect
estimates. If publication, selection, and reporting
biases completely explain the effect differences,
then the replication estimates would be a better
estimate of the effect size than would the meta-
analytic and original results. However, to the
extent that there are other influences, such as
moderation by sample, setting, or quality of rep-
lication, the relative bias influencing original and
replication effect size estimation is unknown.
Subjective assessment of
“Did it replicate?”
In addition to the quantitative assessments of rep-
lication and effect estimation, replication teams
provided a subjective assessment of replication
success of the study they conducted. Subjective
assessments of replication success were very sim-
ilar to significance testing results (39 of 100 suc-
cessful replications), including evaluating “success”
for two null replications when the original study
reported a null result and “failure” for a P < 0.05
replication when the original result was a null.
Correlates of reproducibility
The overall replication evidence is summarized in
Table 1 across the criteria described above and
then separately by journal/discipline. Considering
significance testing, reproducibility was stronger
in studies and journals representing cognitive psy-
chology than social psychology topics. For exam-
ple, combining across journals, 14 of 55 (25%) of
social psychology effects replicated by the P <
0.05 criterion, whereas 21 of 42 (50%) of cogni-
tive psychology effects did so. Simultaneously, all
journals and disciplines showed substantial and
similar [c2(3) = 2.45, P = 0.48] declines in effect
size in the replications comparedwith the original
studies. The difference in significance testing re-
sults between fields appears to be partly a function
of weaker original effects in social psychology
studies, particularly in JPSP, and perhaps of the
greater frequencyof high-poweredwithin-subjects
manipulations and repeatedmeasurement designs
in cognitive psychology as suggested byhighpower
despite relatively small participant samples. Fur-
ther, the type of test was associated with repli-
cation success. Among original, significant effects,
23 of the 49 (47%) that tested main or simple
effects replicated at P < 0.05, but just 8 of the 37
(22%) that tested interaction effects did.
Correlations between reproducibility indica-
tors and characteristics of replication and orig-
inal studies are provided in Table 2. A negative
correlation of replication success with the orig-
inal study P value indicates that the initial
strength of evidence is predictive of reproduc-
ibility. For example, 26 of 63 (41%) original studies
with P < 0.02 achieved P < 0.05 in the replication,
whereas 6 of 23 (26%) that had a P value be-
tween 0.02 < P < 0.04 and 2 of 11 (18%) that had
a P value > 0.04 did so (Fig. 2). Almost two thirds
(20 of 32, 63%) of original studies with P < 0.001
had a significant P value in the replication.
Larger original effect sizes were associated
with greater likelihood of achieving P < 0.05 (r =
0.304) and a greater effect size difference between
original and replication (r = 0.279). Moreover,
replication power was related to replication suc-
cess via significance testing (r = 0.368) but not
with the effect size difference between original
and replication (r = –0.053). Comparing effect
sizes across indicators, surprisingness of the
original effect, and the challenge of conducting
the replication were related to replication suc-
cess for some indicators. Surprising effects were
less reproducible, as were effects for which it was
more challenging to conduct the replication.
Last, there was little evidence that perceived
importance of the effect, expertise of the original
or replication teams, or self-assessed quality of
the replication accounted formeaningful variation
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Fig. 2. Scatterplots of original study and replication P values for three psychology journals.
Data points scaled by power of the replication based on original study effect size. Dotted red lines
indicate P = 0.05 criterion. Subplot below shows P values from the range between the gray lines (P = 0
to 0.005) in the main plot above.
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in reproducibility across indicators. Replication
success was more consistently related to the
original strength of evidence (such as original
P value, effect size, and effect tested) than to
characteristics of the teams and implementation
of the replication (such as expertise, quality, or
challenge of conducting study) (tables S3 and S4).
Discussion
No single indicator sufficiently describes repli-
cation success, and the five indicators examined
here are not the only ways to evaluate reproduc-
ibility. Nonetheless, collectively, these results
offer a clear conclusion: A large portion of repli-
cations produced weaker evidence for the
original findings (31) despite using materials
provided by the original authors, review in
advance for methodological fidelity, and high
statistical power to detect the original effect sizes.
Moreover, correlational evidence is consistent
with the conclusion that variation in the strength
of initial evidence (such as original P value) was
more predictive of replication success than was
variation in the characteristics of the teams con-
ducting the research (such as experience and
expertise). The latter factors certainly can influ-
ence replication success, but the evidence is that
they did not systematically do so here. Other
investigators may develop alternative indicators
to explore further the role of expertise and qual-
ity in reproducibility on this open data set.
Insights on reproducibility
It is too easy to conclude that successful replica-
tionmeans that the theoretical understanding of
the original finding is correct. Direct replication
mainly provides evidence for the reliability of a
result. If there are alternative explanations for
the original finding, those alternatives could like-
wise account for the replication. Understanding
is achieved through multiple, diverse investiga-
tions that provide converging support for a the-
oretical interpretation and rule out alternative
explanations.
It is also too easy to conclude that a failure to
replicate a result means that the original evi-
dence was a false positive. Replications can fail
if the replication methodology differs from the
original in ways that interfere with observing
the effect. We conducted replications designed
to minimize a priori reasons to expect a dif-
ferent result by using original materials, en-
gaging original authors for review of the designs,
and conducting internal reviews. Nonetheless,
unanticipated factors in the sample, setting, or
procedure could still have altered the observed
effect magnitudes (32).
More generally, there are indications of cul-
tural practices in scientific communication that
may be responsible for the observed results. Low-
power research designs combinedwith publication
bias favoring positive results together produce
a literature with upwardly biased effect sizes
(14, 16, 33, 34). This anticipates that replication
effect sizeswould be smaller than original studies
on a routine basis—not because of differences
in implementation but because the original study
effect sizes are affected by publication and report-
ing bias, and the replications are not. Consistent
with this expectation,most replication effectswere
smaller than original results, and reproducibility
success was correlated with indicators of the
strength of initial evidence, such as lower original
P values and larger effect sizes. This suggests pub-
lication, selection, and reporting biases as plausible
explanations for the difference between original
and replication effects. The replication studies sig-
nificantly reduced these biases because replication
preregistration and pre-analysis plans ensured
confirmatory tests and reporting of all results.
The observed variation in replication and
original results may reduce certainty about the
statistical inferences from the original studies
but also provides an opportunity for theoretical
innovation to explain differing outcomes, and
then new research to test those hypothesized
explanations. The correlational evidence, for ex-
ample, suggests that procedures that are more
challenging to execute may result in less re-
producible results, and that more surprising
original effects may be less reproducible than
less surprising original effects. Further, system-
atic, repeated replication efforts that fail to iden-
tify conditions under which the original finding
can be observed reliably may reduce confidence
in the original finding.
Implications and limitations
The present study provides the first open, system-
atic evidence of reproducibility from a sample of
studies in psychology. We sought to maximize
generalizability of the results with a structured
process for selecting studies for replication.How-
ever, it is unknown the extent to which these find-
ings extend to the rest of psychology or other
disciplines. In the sampling frame itself, not all
articles were replicated; in each article, only one
study was replicated; and in each study, only one
statistical result was subject to replication. More
resource-intensive studies were less likely to be
included thanwere less resource-intensive studies.
Although study selection bias was reduced by
the sampling frame and selection strategy, the
impact of selection bias is unknown.
We investigated the reproducibility rate of psy-
chology not because there is something special
about psychology, but because it is our discipline.
Concerns about reproducibility are widespread
across disciplines (9–21). Reproducibility is not well
understood because the incentives for individual
scientists prioritize novelty over replication (20).
If nothing else, this project demonstrates that it
is possible to conduct a large-scale examination
of reproducibility despite the incentive barriers.
Here, we conducted single-replication attempts of
many effects obtaining broad-and-shallow evidence.
These data provide information about reprodu-
cibility in general but little precision about in-
dividual effects in particular. A complementary
narrow-and-deep approach is characterized by
theMany Labs replication projects (32). In those,
many replications of single effects allow precise
estimates of effect size but result in general-
izability that is circumscribed to those individual
effects. Pursuing both strategies across disciplines,
such as the ongoing effort in cancer biology (35),
would yield insight about common and distinct
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Fig. 3. Original study effect size versus replication effect size (correlation coefficients).
Diagonal line represents replication effect size equal to original effect size. Dotted line represents
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challenges andmay cross-fertilize strategies so as
to improve reproducibility.
Because reproducibility is a hallmark of
credible scientific evidence, it is tempting to
think that maximum reproducibility of origi-
nal results is important from the onset of a line
of inquiry through its maturation. This is a
mistake. If initial ideas were always correct,
then there would hardly be a reason to conduct
research in the first place. A healthy discipline
will have many false starts as it confronts the
limits of present understanding.
Innovation is the engine of discovery and is
vital for a productive, effective scientific enter-
prise. However, innovative ideas become old
news fast. Journal reviewers and editors may
dismiss a new test of a published idea as un-
original. The claim that “we already know this”
belies the uncertainty of scientific evidence. De-
ciding the ideal balance of resourcing innova-
tion versus verification is a question of research
efficiency. How can we maximize the rate of
research progress? Innovation points out paths
that are possible; replication points out paths
that are likely; progress relies on both. The ideal
balance is a topic for investigation itself. Scientific
incentives—funding, publication, or awards—can
be tuned to encourage an optimal balance in the
collective effort of discovery (36, 37).
Progress occurs when existing expectations
are violated and a surprising result spurs a new
investigation. Replication can increase certainty
when findings are reproduced and promote
innovation when they are not. This project pro-
vides accumulating evidence for many findings
in psychological research and suggests that there
is still more work to do to verify whether we
know what we think we know.
Conclusion
After this intensive effort to reproduce a sample
of published psychological findings, how many
of the effects have we established are true? Zero.
And howmany of the effects havewe established
are false? Zero. Is this a limitation of the project
design? No. It is the reality of doing science, even
if it is not appreciated in daily practice. Humans
desire certainty, and science infrequently provides
it. Asmuch as wemight wish it to be otherwise, a
single study almost never provides definitive reso-
lution for or against an effect and its explanation.
The original studies examined here offered tenta-
tive evidence; the replicationswe conducted offered
additional, confirmatory evidence. In some cases,
the replications increase confidence in the reli-
ability of the original results; in other cases, the
replications suggest that more investigation is
needed to establish the validity of the original
findings. Scientific progress is a cumulative pro-
cess of uncertainty reduction that can only suc-
ceed if science itself remains the greatest skeptic
of its explanatory claims.
The present results suggest that there is room
to improve reproducibility in psychology. Any
temptation to interpret these results as a defeat
for psychology, or science more generally, must
contend with the fact that this project demon-
strates science behaving as it should. Hypothe-
ses abound that the present culture in science
may be negatively affecting the reproducibility
of findings. An ideological response would dis-
count the arguments, discredit the sources, and
proceed merrily along. The scientific process is
not ideological. Science does not always provide
comfort for what we wish to be; it confronts us
withwhat is.Moreover, as illustrated by the Trans-
parency andOpenness Promotion (TOP)Guidelines
(http://cos.io/top) (37), the research community
is taking action already to improve the quality and
credibility of the scientific literature.
We conducted this project because we care
deeply about the health of our discipline and
believe in its promise for accumulating knowl-
edge about human behavior that can advance
the quality of the human condition. Reproduc-
ibility is central to that aim. Accumulating evi-
dence is the scientific community’s method of
self-correction and is the best available option
for achieving that ultimate goal: truth.
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